

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Security (P&M)

STATINTL FROM:

[REDACTED]
Acting Chief, Policy and Plans Group

SUBJECT: CIA Representation to National Disclosure
Policy Committee

REFERENCES: (a) Memorandum from Chief, Coordination Staff/
NFAC, to Director of Security, dated
8 May 1978, same subject

(b) Memorandum from Mr. [REDACTED] PPG, STATINTL
to Chief, PPG, dated 15 June 1976,
subject: Office of Security Representation
on National Disclosure Policy Committee

STATINTL 1. Reference (a), in requesting that the National Foreign
Assessment Center provide the primary DCI representative to the
National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC), injects a condition
not present when Mr. [REDACTED] wrote Reference (b) and recommended
transfer of the function to the Security Officer, Office of the
DCI, viz. the willingness of NFAC to assume primary NDPC repre-
sentation. But, in my opinion, there is a factor common to both
recommendations, viz. that the DCI would be more appropriately
represented by someone other than a representative of Policy and
Plans Group, Office of Security. STATINTL

2. The above is not to diminish the role that Mr. [REDACTED]
has played in raising the level of participation and interest
in NDPC matters not merely within the Office of Security but,
I suspect, throughout the Agency. He has brought about, through
his energetic and conscientious participation, an interest on
the Agency's part, on the one hand, and a respect for and even
a positive solicitation of the Agency's views by the NDPC, on
the other, which were not previously discernible, by all
accounts. But the void which Mr. [REDACTED] has filled, he has
done so as a surrogate for Agency interests other than those
of the Office of Security, in most instances, and that burden
is one which, in my view, can now be better assumed by NFAC. STATINTL

3. CIA's participation in NDPC decisions is rarely of a security nature in the organizational sense. The recommendations sought from and provided by CIA are usually based on analyses outside the purview of OS. In fact, Mr. [REDACTED] estimates that 99 percent of the issues he has handled had no OS input. Recent examples were the raising of the classification level of certain military hardware information to [REDACTED]

tative finds himself without the professional interest or experience to deal with such issues and ends up merely serving as a messenger. This is not a cost-effective use of a GS-14, and it deprives both CIA and the NDPC of the benefits of on-the-spot contributions by those more expert in these types of questions.

4. The fact that it is valuable for the CIA representative to be able to say that he must consult before offering his agency's views (see page 4 of Reference b) does not justify assigning a person who is least likely to have the professional competence to address matters directly as they arise in NDPC meetings, for any representative would still maintain the need to consult. However, that line of reasoning underscores that security matters rarely arise since it is thought "safest" to be represented by an individual who can most logically buy time pleading lack of expertise and need to consult. I believe that an organization should always be represented by individuals having expertise in the matters likely to be discussed and who will be actively engaged in the internal analyses leading to that organization's official position.

5. It is believed that NFAC, as outlined in Reference (a), is the component best suited to fulfill the above role. It seems to me, further, that the alternate member should logically also come from NFAC if one concurs with my understanding that the alternate is to replace the primary representative when the latter is unable to attend. If the alternate is conceived as a stand-by representative from some other potentially interested component, the DDO might more logically be chosen. Mr. [REDACTED] anticipates that there will be increased security survey activities in which CIA will be invited to participate, but I do not believe that this single recurring item will require regular attendance at NDPC meetings. I would suggest that PPG be designated as the focal point for OS-related NDPC activities but that OS pull out of membership per se.

6. It is, accordingly, recommended that the Director of Security approve the transfer of primary representation on the NDPC to NFAC and that he decline retention of alternate representation responsibility.



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15 JUN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy and Plans Group, OS
FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Plans Branch, PPG/OS
SUBJECT: Office of Security Representation on
the National Disclosure Policy Committee

1. Pursuant to my Letter of Instruction, a review and analysis of the Office of Security's representation and the CIA's participation on the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) has been conducted. It included the following:

a. A historical review of the Office of Security's and the Agency's participation in the NDPC.

b. An evaluation of the Agency's and the Office of Security's current participation in the NDPC.

c. Discussions with the representatives of the DDI, DDO, and DDS&T who serve as focal points within their Directorates for NDPC matters.

2. The historical review, summary attached, drew heavily on a 1975 similar and more detailed study conducted by Mr. [REDACTED]. Several identical points emerge from both studies:

a. The Agency is not the "favorite child" of the NDPC.

b. The NDPC would prefer that the DCI representative not be selected from the Office of Security. (In 1966 they stated their preference that the DCI representative not be drawn from a Security Division.) The DCI stated he saw no reason to change his representative and has

continued to use the Office of Security to represent him on the NDPC.

c. In the last five years there has been an erosion, especially in NDPC security surveys, in the Office of Security participation and, therefore, the Agency's participation relative to NDPC matters. Secondly, the Agency has not submitted an NDPC request in approximately four years.

3. Without suggesting that the Office of Security and, therefore, the Agency has reached anywhere near its full potential relative to the NDPC, it would seem that in some aspects we have been able to enhance our position over the last year. This results from:

a. In the past, it has been our practice to have a senior security officer named as the prime representative while it was his alternate, a junior officer, who carried out all the day-by-day transactions with the NDPC. The prime alternate was only a name to the NDPC. In 1976, the Office of Security installed a junior officer as the prime representative and a senior officer as his alternate. Consequently, day-by-day activities are handled by the prime representative.

b. The Agency recently initiated, and received approval on, an NDPC case whose processing required considerable interface between the Agency and the NDPC.

c. During the past year, the Agency has had reason to challenge two NDPC actions. In one instance, the Agency wished to voice a precautionary note relative to an NDPC decision concerning [REDACTED]. In the second instance, the Agency challenged the approach NDPC was taking concerning a report they were preparing for the White House on security compromises of NDPC releases. Both cases were literally "hammered out" before the entire Committee and in both cases we achieved accommodation without compromise. Those days "in court" did well for the Agency. Committee members from other government agencies volunteered, almost to a man, that they supported both our position and the manner in which we presented it.

d. As a corollary to c., there has been a noticeable increase in contact of the CIA representative by other members of the NDPC. It appears they are more prone than formerly to call. Although most contacts do concern NDPC, Committee members call occasionally for assistance on other Agency related matters.

4. The evaluation of our current participation also revealed that there is still much work to be done:

a. Over the years we have accumulated six full safe drawers of NDPC material that is never used.

b. The Agency has still not been asked to participate on an NDPC security survey or to brief those representatives who will participate on a survey.

c. The Office of Security's primary role is that of a conduit between the NDPC and the Agency component that has an actual interest in NDPC actions.

5. It was with these three "deficiencies" in mind that PPG initiated discussions with representatives of the DDI, DDO, and DDS&T who serve as the NDPC focal points for their respective Directorates. The discussions centered upon the "deficiencies" and how they could be corrected.

6. It was agreed that the stockpile of unused NDPC material should be destroyed as duplicate copies of all the material were disseminated to appropriate Agency components upon receipt. We could draw upon the NDPC Office within the Pentagon if a requirement necessitated the location of a past reference, even under a short deadline. In brief, the material takes up space, contributes nothing and is not needed as a reserve.

7. Concerning the Agency's lack of participation in the NDPC's security survey program, it was also agreed that we could reflect an increased interest by inviting those NDPC officers selected to participate on a security survey to come to the Agency for a "country" briefing. It was recognized that this could not be done in every

case. Appropriate clearances would be involved as well as decisions by the "country" desk that they had pertinent information and the time to prepare and present a briefing. However, it was the consensus that if such briefings could be presented even a fraction of the time, it would definitely show a genuine desire to participate and contribute.

8. Concerning the Office of Security role, all three representatives from the other Directorates believe that the central NDPC focal point for the Agency should remain within the Office of Security. Historically, the Directorates have been happy with the service. Historically, a past DCI has gone on record stating that he opted to have his representative on the NDPC come from the Office of Security. It was also conceded during the discussion with the representatives from the other Directorates that it is a very practical gratuity that the present system allows the CIA representative to candidly state he must consult with an appropriate desk before voicing an Agency opinion; that as a Security Officer, he is not an area specialist, and cannot be expected to be an authority on a particular country. There are times when questions before the NDPC require that the Agency be deliberately precise in what it says and how it says it. The conduit role, because we must consult, allows time for studied preciseness.

9. The discussions with the other Directorate representatives also developed that it would be a very difficult task to select a more appropriate component to represent the DCI on the NDPC. In almost all NDPC cases, both the DDI and DDO have a concern from the standpoint that they want to know what information or material is released, or requested by a foreign country. The DDS&T also has a very pertinent interest in some of the hardware that is released and to whom it is released. In summary, from the viewpoint that there is no other component that would more naturally fit the role, it was concluded that the Office of Security should continue to provide the DCI representative on the NDPC.

10. Upon completion of these discussions, PPG then investigated the possibility that there is some other Office of Security component better suited for the task. This investigation developed that there would be considerable merit in having the Security Officer for the Office of the DCI also serve as the DCI representative on the NDPC.

The reasons for this conclusion are:

- a. The position title of "DCI Representative to NDPC" implies that if the selectee were part of the DCI Staff, he would be in a better position to serve as the DCI representative. The Security Officer for the Office of the DCI is part of the DCI Staff.
- b. As the focal point within the Agency for the NDPC, a position on the DCI Staff appears to be much more catholic in scope than if the representative were drawn from any of the four Directorates.
- c. Any conflict, or even any potential conflict, that could develop between the CIA and NDPC would necessarily involve the DCI's attention. The Security Officer for the Office of the DCI would have the best vantage point for knowing who on the DCI Staff should be advised of the situation and how it should be done.
- d. The overall effect of the change would be good on the NDPC. They would view it as a decision of the DCI to select his representative from his own personnel staff as opposed to having the designee come from one of the four Directorates.
- e. "d." would honor the NDPC request of 1966. However, it would be done within the DCI's decision to maintain an Office of Security representative as his representative on the NDPC.

11. In summary, as a result of this study, ~~PPC~~ **I** recommend:

- a. With the lifting of the destruction moratorium, and after the Records Management Schedule has been appropriately changed, all six drawers on NDPC material be destroyed.
- b. All future correspondence from the NDPC will be sent directly to the appropriate CIA components for their retention or destruction.

The Office of Security should retain copies of this material for three months after which it should be destroyed. This would keep accumulation to a minimum.

c. Working with the DDI and DDO representatives, the Agency should take positive steps to reflect the CIA desire to participate and contribute to the NDPC security survey program.

d. The Security Officer for the Office of the DCI should be named as the DCI representative on the NDPC.

12. In presenting recommendation d., it is recognized that this can only be effected when that officer has the concurrence of his own supervisor on the DCI Staff and when his own workload allows him to accept the additional task. It also recognizes that the PPG Security Officer would function as an alternate until that time when a more appropriate Office of Security representative could be selected for that position.

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Att.

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*Para 11 recommendation
approved, except para 11, d.*

ATTACHMENT

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SUBJECT: Historical Review of Office of Security
and Agency Participation in the National
Disclosure Policy Committee

1. CIA involvement in the National Military Information Disclosure program commenced in 1949 when an Agency representative was given an "observer" status on the State - Defense Military Information Control Committee. In 1959 the observer status was challenged in a survey of the S-DMICC by a National Security Council representative who recommended that membership be limited to State-DDO-Army, Navy, Air Force, and AEC with participation by other agencies only when the subject matter involved their interest. The final NSC action, September 1959, signed by the President, established that there would be voting representation by the CIA on items of concern to them under consideration by S-DMICC.

2. The right of vote did not resolve the issue of membership which was left open until 1964 when the "United States National Disclosure Policy" issued by the Secretary of State stipulated for the first time that the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence was a regular voting member.

3. In 1969 the State Department, in the first draft of a National Disclosure Policy revision, dropped the DCI representative from membership. In effect, the membership had resulted from the State Department's 1964 policy paper which was above the intent of NSC's 1959 action to give CIA voting representation on items of concern to them. The DCI strongly demurred and opted for continual general membership. The matter was resolved by the establishment of the Categories of General and Special Membership. The DCI, as Chief Intelligence Officer of the United States, accepted Special Membership on the basis that "my representative will be kept informed on all matters brought before the NDPC."

4. Other problems of the NDPC which have a direct interest to the DCI are the selection of the CIA representative for the NDPC and the Committees Security inspection function.

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5. In 1966, two studies of Committee activities by the Department of State and Defense, concluded that the CIA appointees should be from a high enough level to permit decision making and from a non-technical or operational directorate. One report actually stated a preference for representation other than from the Security divisions. The DCI responded that he saw no impediment to NDPC efforts caused by having his representative selected from the Office of Security. If problems developed concerning timely and adequate responses, he was to be advised and would then take corrective action. There has been no question on choice of the CIA representative since that time.

6. The problem of Agency participation in NDPC Security inspections appears to be one of erosion. Since 1949 the NDPC conducted approximately 90 surveys and the Agency provided representation in fifteen instances. The last survey team accompanied by a CIA representative was in 1968 and the Agency has not been asked to participate since 1970 when Chairmanship of the NDPC passed from the State Department to the Department of Defense. On 17 April 1975, the NDPC issued its tentative schedule for CY 1975 through CY 1977. Ten surveys are planned. The CIA has not been invited to participate. Although not officially stated, the Committee has limited survey team membership in the past because (a) budget restrictions and (b) because Ambassadors prefer small groups. Furthermore, team membership generally goes to the military who have a primary interest in the hardware involved.

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